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Abstract:  
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the evolution of both schemes and levels of public support to railway 
sector in selected European countries. Although prior research sheds some light on this topic, more information 
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railway undertakings. Focusing on Italy, besides the reduction of capital grants, justified by the completion of the 
high-speed line Turin-Milan-Naples, this paper finds an increasing support to the service operators and in the 
meantime a reduction of subsidies aimed at financing network operations. This shift of resources may undermine 
competition. The findings of this study help to fill the gap in estimating State aid to European  railways. 
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Introduction 
In today's fast-paced, knowledge-intensive environment, State aid control should more effectively 
target sustainable growth-enhancing policies while encouraging budgetary consolidation, limiting 
distortions of competition and keeping the single market open. Knipes (2013) provides a short outline 
of the historical roots of the controversial debates on the role of the State and the markets, and the 
organization of competition in European railroad industries. State aid is defined as an advantage in any 
form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities. 
Therefore, subsidies granted to individuals or general measures open to all enterprises are not covered 
by this prohibition and do not constitute State aid. In 2012 The EU Commission has proposed a recast 
of a directive establishing a single European railway area, aiming to increase competition in the rail 
market by improving access to terminals and maintenance facilities and strengthening the powers of 
national rail regulators (Directive 2012/34/EU). However, investigations into public support measures 
granted to national rail carriers have recently been opened. Firms, specially incumbents, must 
therefore find the right balance between industrial consolidation and competition since they are not 
mutually exclusive while Governments shall thrive in (i) regulating the rail sector in accordance with 
the EU legislation which many EU countries signed up to over ten years ago, and (ii) remove other 
barriers to competition and service growth. Prior research has analysed the reforms (Preston, 2009), 
methods to explore the impact of subsidies on competition (Nitsche & Heidhues, 2006), the 
effectiveness of State aid in increasing the efficiency in railways across Europe (Friederiszick, Röller, 
& Schulz, 2003), train access charges (Knieps & Zenhäusern, 2011), the European rail reform (Nash, 
2010).  
However, there may be circumstances in which more information is required to clarify national 
obligations under European Railway liberalisation law in relation to charging, allocation, incentives to 
improve performance and the permitted structure of Infrastructure Managers and Railway 
Undertakings. In this paper we consider the evolution of public subsidies throughout a cross-country 
comparison; insights from Italy, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, and France are provided. We 
develop this idea in detail by analysing and combining income statements, official documents and 
scholar’s analyses in an effort to reconstruct public subsidies to the Italian railway incumbent starting 
from 1992, when Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) was converted into a joint-stock company. Finally, our 
analysis sheds light to what extent public subsidies have been meant to grants for current expenses and 
grants related to assets. Data were retrieved from national incumbents and from respective regulators.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in the first section to introduce European 
legislation and guides on State aid related to railways, we then discuss steps in some European 
countries; this is followed by the Italian case and conclusion.  
Literature Review 
A number of reforms have affected the European rail market over the last two decades, Preston (2009) 
reviews what actual changes have occurred on the ground over this period. Friebel, Ivaldi & Vibes 
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(2010) estimate the effects of reforms on railroad efficiency in Europe by using a new panel data set 
that covers most EU countries over a period of more than 20 years. In the paper of Couto & Graham 
(2009) the cost structure of the railway industry is analysed using a stochastic frontier approach. 
Knipes (2013) evaluates competition on the markets for rail services and public subsidies for rail 
infrastructures as well as subsidies for train services. Di Foggia & Lazzarotti (2013) focus on the 
business implication of development policies, Szekely (2009) sheds a light on the transformation 
schemes in Europe so that it would be possible for countries to set up better policies. For instance the 
expenses of rail infrastructure costs are partly covered by the European governments and partly by the 
infrastructure managers through the infrastructure charges that operators pay to them for rendering 
services in the infrastructure they manage.  
The processes of vertical and horizontal separation within the railway sector are relatively recent in 
many European countries, and as a result, little analytical research has been carried out on their impact 
(Cantos, Pastor & Serrano, 2010). Growitsch & Wetzel (2009) conduct a pan-European efficiency 
analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of 
vertical integration. A key role is played by access charges for the use of the infrastructure, Andersson 
& Ögren (2007) state that in order to achieve a competitive transport sector, infrastructure charges in 
the European Union should be based on short-run marginal costs. Calvo & De Oña, (2012) study a 
series of national charging systems to compare track usage costs and the charges that seek to recover 
those costs. They also examine the pricing levels applied to railway services to study the coherence 
between national charging systems and the charging principle on which they are based. By the same 
token Beria et al., (2012) provide an analysis of the relationship between the State and the rail 
companies, network access conditions by operators, slot allocating and pricing schemes and how 
public service obligations are defined, financed and regulated.  EU rules require track access charges 
to be set on the basis of direct/marginal costs – the cost directly incurred as a result of operating a train 
service. As an exception for specific investment projects only, higher charges can be set on the basis of 
the long-term costs of such projects, (Directive 2012/34/EU). 
The topic of subsidies to European railways has been less investigated because of the disparities in 
management systems, access charge models and ownership of incumbent operators. Also Beria et al., 
(2012) argue that entry in the industry has not yet developed its full potential and highlight that an 
issue emerging in this research is the opposing attitude of incumbent railways against liberalisation 
and the role of governments in backing this behaviour. To this regard, by comparing Sweden, Great 
Britain and Germany, the examination of subsidy levels finds that Germany has the slowest growth in 
public financial support for its railway, as well as the lowest increase in fares (Nash, Nilsson & Link, 
2013) and model Nilsson et al., (2013) describe recent reforms in Sweden, and to address how the 
reforms have handled four critical issues for the success of the reforms: the allocation of infrastructure 
capacity; the provision of maintenance and terminal facilities; the access to rolling stock; and the 
provision of information and ticketing to travellers. Nilsson, J. E. (2002) describes the Swedish 
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reorganisation, the subsequent process towards free entry and competition in parts of the sector and the 
consequences of these changes and argues that the policies have been mainly directed towards the 
sector’s inability to recover costs. 
Rail subsidies in Europe  
Control of State aid in Europe has become a key element (EU Commission, 2011). In fact, it is a 
useful tool to protect fair competition. Holvad (2006) provides an overview of railway reforms in 
Europe which at EU level were initiated by Directive 91/440, he also focuses on the background to the 
reform process. To be compliant with EU rules, aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources shall not distort competition and trade within the EU by favouring certain companies or the 
production of certain goods (TFEU, 2008). The report of NERA (2004) assesses the public budget 
contributions to the financing of railway undertakings and rail infrastructure managers, as well as to 
review their financial position. EU Parliament has recently proposed a recast of the first railway 
package, some major objectives of the proposed recast are: avoiding distortions of competition due to 
the use of State funds for commercial activities, eliminating conflicts of interest in the management of 
rail-related services and increasing their availability for new entrants as well as increasing market 
transparency to ensure effective competition. Over the last thirty years, the level of non-crisis State aid 
has decreased: in the 1980s the share of the total GDP intended for aid in various forms was about 2%, 
while in 2001 about 0.6% of European GDP. The amount of subsidies to the railway sector, limited to 
the countries that have made available the data (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal and Sweden), amounted to €27.2 billion. From 
the second half of the 90s there was the introduction of the access charges for the new EU members; 
the experience of those EU States has been showing how their approach has been a reasonable 
compromise between two aims: charge systems whose first priority was favouring an efficient use of 
networks and, as second aim, having an adequate level of coverage of the costs of the operator. 
 
Revenues and subsidies in selected countries 
We now introduce some information about the selected countries. Table 1 contains total revenues, 
market revenues and revenues by subsidies. Data refer to passengers sector without distinguish 
between local and long distance. Values are expressed in euro cents per passenger-Km. 
Table 1: Revenues and subsidies per passenger-Km (€ cents). 
 
Sweden 
Great 
Britain Italy France Germany 
Subsides 0.9 1.6 5 5.2 6.7 
Market revenues 10.7 15.6 7.6 9.9 8.8 
Total revenues 11.6 17.2 12.6 15.1 15.5 
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Source: 2012 reports of Network Rail, Arrigo & Di Foggia (2013b) 
 
Great Britain 
Until the 1994–1995 reform, public financial support for the railway sector was composed of direct 
subsidies to British Rail (BR) and Passengers Transport Executives (PTE), as well as loans to British 
Rail by the National Fund Loan. The privatisation process of the railway sector has led to changes in 
the scheme of public funding. The subsidy levels have been set in order to allow newly established 
railway undertakings to obtain commercial returns, offsetting unprofitable lines. Over the years of the 
reform’s implementation, the net funding requirement to support the industry has been reduced by the 
proceeds from the sale of rolling stock operating companies and the remaining assets of British 
Railway, the latter not related to passenger traffic. Since 1997–1998, the Government's support for the 
railway sector has mainly consisted of transfers provided by the Office Passenger Rail Franchising 
afterwards by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and finally by the Department for Transport – from 
grants to Passenger Transport Executives, and by a contribution to British Railway to finance its 
remaining activities. In the 2000s, direct government transfers to the managers of the network became 
increasingly important. The different categories of support are the following: (i) direct subsidies for 
the network operator, (ii) transfers from the central government to the train operating companies’ 
passenger franchise agreements and performance receipts (specifications and performance awards), 
(iii) transfers to Passengers Transport Executives for the metropolitan rail transport, (iv) grants to 
freight rail transport. In the year 2010–2011, the network managed by Network Rail (15.800 km) 
hosted 514 million trains-Km, corresponding to 54.5 billion passengers/km and 19.2 billion tonnes/km 
of goods, for a total of 73.7 billion units of traffic. To this extent it is possible to figure out the 
following data per km: operating costs equal €177 while market revenues of the operator add up to 
€165, thus €12 represents the difference. The central Government total grant was €271 thousand-km, 
mainly aimed at covering the remaining costs of the operator. Dividing the total operating costs by the 
trains-Km, we calculate €5.4 total operating cost train-Km; €5.1 covered by the market revenues of the 
operator (of which €4.3 are from access charges and €0.7 from other revenues) and public subsidies 
for the difference. Since it is likely that a proportion of operating costs had been generated from the 
production of services not directly related to the network's traffic, we prefer to deduct from the 
operating costs the value of operating revenues not directly derived from the network services. We 
then obtain operating costs that are approximately €4.7 train-Km, of which €4.3 are covered by the 
access charge revenues and the remaining €0.4 by public subsidy. Considering the total traffic unit 
transported (passengers kilometres more tonnes of goods km), it is plausible to calculate operating 
costs attributable to the network totalling €0.033 cents – revenues from the market are €0.03 cents, the 
residue are public subsidies. In relation to the costs of the network operator, Network Rail stated in its 
2012 budget, reports the continued reduction of unit costs made possible by the increase in efficiency 
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achieved thanks to the traffic increase. The overall reduction in the unit cost in seven year is 34.6% 
(5.9% per year).  
Sweden 
In the period before the separation of the network, until 1988, the public operator SJ (vertically 
integrated incumbent) was both the only interlocutor of the government for assistance in the field and 
the sole beneficiary of public transfers. They could: (i) purchase from the state of transportation 
services that were not provided by SJ because they were related to geographic areas with low demand. 
It is the case with Public Service Obligations – (ii) compensation for tariff awarded to support specific 
categories of users, (iii) financing of investments that would not have been carried out by SJ as 
unprofitable, (iv) cancellation of SJ debts (in favour of the State). On this last point, it should be noted 
that SJ could not obtain funding from the private sector but only from the State. It could be that the 
total debt proved stable growth over time and would make periodic culls necessary. In overall terms, 
during the decade preceding the reform, the various types of transfer generated an average three billion 
SEK annual outlay for the public purse at constant 2001 prices (300 million euro). Thanks to the 1988 
reform and the stages of the subsequent years, the types of subsidy have changed. Transfers designed 
to cover the difference between the costs of operation and maintenance of the network and access 
charge revenues, together with investments for renovation of the network and new projects, were 
headed by Banverket, while the fees for transportation services not economically self-sufficient were 
directed to operators of passenger rail. A large part of the costs incurred by the management of 
Swedish infrastructure was directed to new investments and infrastructure renewal. From the post 
reform to the beginning of the 2000s, the ordinary costs of the network were about two billion SEK 
per year (200 million euro). The revenue from access charges covered a remarkable share when one 
considers the adoption of the criterion of short-run marginal cost in setting tariff. Investments 
improved by more than 50% throughout the last four years (2008–2011). It is therefore possible to 
calculate cost and unit revenues, dividing total € by the network’s length and traffic levels. In 2010, 
the Swedish railway network managed by Trafikverket (10,000 km), hosted 139 million train-Km, 
passengers and goods, and transported 11.2 billion passengers/km and 23.5 billion tonnes/km of 
goods, generating a total of 34.7 billion units of traffic. The technical productivity of the network was 
equal to 13,900 yearly trains-Km, corresponding to thirty-nine trains daily on average. To this extent it 
is possible to figure out the following data per km: Operating costs equal €46, market revenues of the 
operator are €8, thus the difference is €36. The overall public sector costs for renovation and 
investment were €105 thousand. If we combine the economic data with traffic data, we obtain €3.3 
operating costs of the network to train-km and €0.5 revenues train-Km. In relation to units of total 
traffic carried, we obtain a cost of €0.013 and revenue market share to 0.02 cents. 
Germany 
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Public subsidies to the German railway system are divided into financial support from the central 
government to DB Netz for investment and the local authorities responsible for charges arising from 
Public Service Obligations for regional transportation. Based on the data available for 2010, more than 
85% of national spending provided for this purpose was granted to Deutsche Bahn. Using the data 
reported in Dehornoy (2011), it can be seen that the total burden for the German railway system 
amounted to €15.9 billion – €10.2 if we exclude the federal support to BEV (Federal Railway Fund) 
aimed at debt management and the payment of pensions to former employees of the two railway 
companies of Western and Eastern Germany. Of the €10.2 billion, about €4.6 were directed to the 
network and €5.6 to cover the costs arising from regional rail transport. As for subsidies for the 
network, it should be noted that, based on German railway reform, DB Netz has to operate according 
to market principles and, therefore, does not benefit from public funding to cover the recurrent costs 
arising from the exercise. Dehornoy (2011) shows that the €4.2 billion transfers from the Bund are 
enough to finance most of the investments. Considering that in the same year the trains-Km circulating 
on the German network were 1.06 billion, the average cost of the network operator was €3.6 train-Km. 
Data show that the access charges of freight trains account for 18% of total revenues, the cost of the 
network and stations are 25% of revenues of the long-distance passenger segment and the cost of 
network and stations are 37% of segment revenues of the regional passenger segment. For all the three 
types of rail transport, the sum of network and station charges covers 30% of revenues. Dividing €5.2 
billion of infrastructure revenue by 1.06 billion yearly train-Km, we obtain €4.9 average cost train-Km 
(€4.0 without considering the use of stations and additional services). Dividing the net income derived 
from any type of traffic for its trains-Km per year, we calculate an average cost of €5.3 train-Km for 
regional transportation, €6.2 for long-distance and €3.9 for freight trains. The 2010 network's technical 
productivity was 31400 annual trains-Km, corresponding to 86 trains a day on average. 
France 
According to Dehornoy (2011), the total amount of subsidies to rail transport were €12.9 billion in 
2010; €9.8 billion if we exclude the State contribution intended to supplement the pension fund of the 
former railway workers. Of the €9.8 billion awarded, €5.2 billion were assigned to SNCF (of which 
€4.3 billion were assigned to public service obligations and €0.9 billion aimed at investments), while 
€4.6 billion to the infrastructure manager RFF (including €2.4 billion grants for current expenses and 
€2.2 billion for investments). Summing up the total subsidies to the two entities, we calculate €6.7 
billion for operating expenses and €3.1 billion for investments. The data from the annual report of the 
Comptes des transports allow us to update the analysis of public subsidies. In 2011, the total burden 
was €12.5 billion, which decreased to €9.3 when considered net of the State contribution to the 
pension fund, and €5.3 billion out of €9.3 billion were allocated to SNCF (€4.7 billion for public 
service obligations and €0.6 billion in investments), and €4 billion to the infrastructure manager. The 
total subsidies to the two entities –grants for current expenses– amounted to €7.0 billion, those in 
capital account to €2.3 billion. In order to determine which types of costs are funded by State grants 
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for current expenses and the degree of coverage of the costs of RFF guaranteed by rail access charges, 
it is necessary to refer to the 2011 income statement. Industrial management of RFF has been active 
since the ordinary expenses of operation of the network were fully covered by access charges collected 
for the transit of trains; of the €4.5 billion access charges, 66% relating to transport goods and 
passengers to the long distance borne by the railway undertakings and 33% relative to local passenger 
transport borne by the public sector. Considering additional €0.8 billion from other government grants 
and €1 billion of other incomes, the infrastructure manager fully covered all production costs. The 
values of cost and revenue can be associated with trains-Km produced in the year in order to calculate 
the unit values. The calculation can only be carried out for the year 2010, when the operating costs of 
RFF amounted to €3.65 billion compared with trains-Km outstanding of 484.8 million. The average 
cost train-Km of the infrastructure manager was therefore €7.5. Instead, the average cost incurred by 
the railways for the use of the network was €8.7 (€4.2 billion access charges for 484.8 million trains-
Km). The network's technical productivity was 15,700 annual train-Km, corresponding to forty-three 
daily trains. The trains-Km were 485 million. Given that they generated €4.2 billion revenues from 
access charges, we can infer €8.7 as average access charge train-Km. Integrating data from Références 
(2012), we estimate access charges by the regional transport amounting to €1.45 billion, which 
corresponds to €6.4 access charge train-Km. Subtracting the total charges, we infer that the total 
charges paid by long-distance passenger trains and freight trains amounted to €2.75 billion. Based on 
current rates, it is reasonable to assume that the average value for the freight train km is €4.6. Based on 
the above assumptions, the average cost for the use of a passenger train in France would be €9.4 per 
km. 
Italy 
The public sector has sustained rail transport in Italy with significant subsidies, which were mainly to 
cover the operating costs of the railway network, the cost of local rail transport and the financing of 
investment programmes. Cascetta, Coppola & Velardi, (2013) present some empirical evidences on 
the evolution of national passenger demand before and after high-speed rail major openings, and show 
a significant increase of traffic volume by rail due to the introduction of high-speed rail. These 
findings are consistent with the need of transparency among competitors statements. A complete and 
accurate reconstruction of all subsidies for rail transport in Italy is, however, hampered by the absence 
of a dedicated body. In order to cover quite a long period – at least from the 1992 transformation of FS 
into a joint-stock company – we use a plurality of sources in relation to different sub-periods: (i) 
1992–1995, the total annual transfer of current portion is between €5.3 and €6.3 billion, with an 
average annual value of €5.7 billion (Arrigo & Di Foggia, 2013b) and (ii) 1996–2006, sharp reduction 
of public transfers, €2.3 billion from €5.7 granted in the previous year, a reduction of almost 60%. In 
the following years, they return to higher values but still below the levels found before 1997. (iii) 
1998–2001, the annual income statement contributions amounted to an average annual value of €4.2 
billion, of which €1.5 represented by grants to the network, €1.6 from transfers in favour of 
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unprofitable transport services and €1 billion represented by the use of the restructuring fund. (iv) 
2002–2005, Annual average support (Income statement contributions) increased to €4.6 billion, 
mainly due to the increased use of the restructuring fund. The contribution to the exercise of the 
network and transport services unprofitable instead falls from €3.1 to €2.9. It also changes their 
distribution, with a decrease in the subsidy to the network at €1.1 billion, and an increase to €1.8 
billion toward transport services. (v) 2007–09 (FS balance sheet), €4.3 billion income statement 
contributions emerged. (vi) 2010–2011, Total transfers (income statement contributions) declined, but 
it should be noted that the financial statements of the group FS lost in clarity and no longer explicitly 
mentioned some items representing support from the State. In the entire period of FS (1992–2011), 
total public support amounted to €88.6 billion (current values), corresponding to €4.4 billion annually. 
In addition to income statement contributions, the public sector has supported over time rail transport 
even with substantial contributions to investment programmes. From 1997 to 2005, the investment 
support was through FS capital increases signed by the Ministry of Economy. During the nine years in 
which this form was used, the total outlay was slightly more than €15 billion, equivalent to €3.3 billion 
yearly average. With the 2006 financial law, also, the State agreed to cover 13 billion of debts of FS. 
Since 2006, capital increasing policy has been abandoned replaced by the policy of granting direct 
contributions to investments. The contributions made to this qualification had achieved in the six years 
between 2006 and 2011 a total of €21.4 billion. Over the whole period 1997–2011, the FS grants 
related to capital account reached €67 billion. All through the same period, the total investment of FS 
added up to €81 billion. If to public grants related to capital account we add those related to grants for 
current expenses, amounting to €60 billion in 15 years, we obtain €127 billion total public support to 
FS, corresponding to an annual average of €8.5 billion. Compared with the German and French cases, 
there is a greater variability over time. It is also possible to note that in recent years, besides the 
reduction of capital account support, justified by the completion of the HS Turin-Milan-Naples line, 
there has been a growth of support for the transport services and a reduction of support for the running 
of the network. This shift of resources does not foster competition since public support for the network 
is potentially neutral in respect to operators who use it, while the one in favour of the operators creates 
advantage only for the operators that run it, which have not been identified so far through tender 
procedures capable of ensuring effective competition for the market. 
Table 2: Subsidies to FS Group (million €) 
  
Operating 
grants 
Capital 
grants 
Total 
subsidies 
Investment      
(FS group) 
1992 6,348 
   1993 6,072 
   1994 5,110 
   1995 5,322 
   1996 5,733 
   1997 2,329 2,633 4,962 2,759 
1998 4,125 3,068 7,193 3,394 
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1999 4,023 3,822 7,845 3,527 
2000 4,207 3,176 7,383 3,798 
2001 4,380 3,615 7,995 4,845 
2002 5,060 4,078 9,138 5,504 
2003 4,107 4,051 8,158 7,208 
2004 4,948 2,989 7,937 8,447 
2005 4,117 3,540 7,657 8,528 
2006 3,151 17,951 21,102 7,263 
2007 4,244 4,277 8,521 6,864 
2008 4,366 3,332 7,697 6,096 
2009 4,146 5,089 9,234 5,250 
2010 3,512 2,294 5,806 4,143 
2011 3,329 3,155 6,484 3,808 
Total 88,628 67,069 127,111 81,434 
Yearly average 4,431 4,471 8,474 5,429 
 
Source: Arrigo & Beccarello (2000);  and Arrigo & Di Foggia (2013a) 
 
Discussion 
Table 3 highlights important aspects of the five rail networks: first, the extension of the different 
networks: Italy and Great Britain have a similar length and occurs equally between France and 
Germany, however, the network in the first two countries is about half if compared to the last two 
while the Swedish is about a third. 
Table 3: Derived indicators of network cost and revenues 
 
France Germany 
Great 
Britain Italy Sweden 
Network size 30.9 33.7 15.8 16.7 10 
Network operative cost (bil.€) 3.6 3.8 2.4 1.7 0.5 
Network cost (th.€) 118 113 153 104 46 
Total yearly trains-km (mil.€) 485 1,060 514 324 139 
Average daily trains-Km 43 86 89 53 38 
Operative costs trains-Km (€) 7.5 3.6 4.7 5.4 3.3 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (2013)  
 
The annual costs of rail network operations appear to be proportional to the extension of the 
infrastructure. If we estimate the network’s costs per km we obtain analogous values for Italy, 
Germany and France; in fact the three countries show an average cost per km that range between €104 
thousand in Italy and €118 thousand in France. The average cost in the Great Britain is €153 thousand, 
while the cost in Sweden is €46 thousand. Sweden is an interesting case that should be investigated to 
see how the cost advantage is a consequence of the organizational model used, featuring: public and 
integrated management with the management of the road network and outsourcing of maintenance and 
intervention on the lines that are awarded through a tenders as well as light organizational structure 
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with few structured personnel. The network traffic levels are very different: for instance in Germany 
yearly train-Km are more than double if compared with France, although the network has a similar 
extension – mainly due to the high development of freight transport in Germany. In turn, trains-Km in 
Great Britain, which have seen a quickly growth thanks to the reform and liberalization of the market 
in the '90s, are 60% more than in Italy and France. These specificity impact on the technical 
productivity of network: in Great Britain and Germany, as an average transit 90 daily trains-Km, both 
passenger and freight; slightly over 50 in Italy and France, a little less in Sweden. Considering the 
average cost per train-Km of the network (which is obtained by dividing the total annual cost for the 
train-Km) the highest value is €7.5 in France, then comes Italy with €5.4 train-Km and Great Britain 
with €4.7 train-Km, the latter is followed by Germany and Sweden with €3.6 and €3.3 respectively. 
Considering the data provided, one may note that the cost advantage of rail transport in Italy resulting 
from the low burden of network usage does not derive from a cost advantage of the network operator, 
but by the fact that the rates are properly maintained below the average cost thanks to subsidies to the 
network (operating grants). Image 2 shows the relationship between average costs per train km of the 
network operator and average charge applied to passenger trains. The difference between the two 
values is covered by public subsidies when the average access charge is less than the average cost 
(Sweden, Italy, and Great Britain) and is intended to finance other costs or margins of the operator in 
the opposite case (France and Germany). 
Figure 1: Average cost, charge and subsidies 
 
Source: Authors 
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The Italian €3 average charge for the use of the network per train km results to be viable thanks to the 
presence of public subsidies covering 2.4 euro that in turn corresponds to the missing amount to cover 
€5.4 average cost per train km of the network operator. In Sweden, on the other hand higher train-Km 
subsidy, precisely €2.8, allows to apply €0.5 access charges per train-Km. The passenger rail transport 
in Italy has both an advantage and a weakness: the first is represented by the low cost for the use of the 
network, the second by the lower unit revenue by market resulting from lower average charge per km. 
It is now appropriate considerate the validity of the train system regulatory assets, observing in 
particular who is the regulator of the sector, its level of independence from the government, the 
infrastructure manager and the train operators, the adequacy of its regulatory powers and of its powers 
of protection against the competitors. Table 4 gives the evaluations to the above listed conditions. As it 
can be observed, Sweden and Great Britain have the best market asset. There’s a prevalence of 
positive evaluations in the cases of Germany, a prevalence of negative evaluations for France and 
Italy. As an answer against the EU remarks, France created in 2009 the Autorité de Régulation des 
Activités Ferroviaire. 
Table 4: Regulator and infrastructure manager independence 
 
Sweden 
Great 
Britain 
Germany France Italy 
Independent regulator Yes Yes Yes No No 
Regulator with sufficient 
control powers 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Infrastructure manager 
independent from railway 
operator 
Yes Yes No No No 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD-ECMT 2008 
 
In order to conduct more detailed considerations on the differences in unit revenues by market among 
the considered cases, we represent the Table 1 in a different version in which all values are 
recalculated by setting equal to 100 the unit revenues from the Italian market, thus taken as the value 
basis as in Table 5. 
Table 5: Revenues and subsidies per passenger-Km, (Italy = 100) 
 
Sweden 
Great 
Britain Italy France Germany 
Subsides 12 21 65 68 88 
Market revenues 140 204 100 129 114 
Total revenues 151 225 165 197 202 
 
Source: Authors 
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As Table 5 shows, market unit revenues are higher in all countries if compared with Italy, in 
particular, large differences are found in Sweden and Great Britain, these countries do not strongly 
rely on public subsidies, slightly more elevated revenues in Germany (+14%) and in France (+29%), 
but one should consider that in France more than 60% of passengers use high-speed trains. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined State aid to rail transport in some European countries, considering that 
it should more effectively target sustainable growth-enhancing policies while encouraging budgetary 
consolidation. Competition policy and legislation aim to ensure that rail transport markets operate 
efficiently. This is especially important when newly competitive markets are emerging as a result of 
liberalisation processes. The potential for rail transport growth throughout Europe is huge, but it needs 
a concerted effort by governments, regulators, incumbents and others to make it happen. European 
markets for passenger rail transport services were highly regulated for a number of decades. In recent 
years, however, efforts have intensified to make this market segment more competitive (Beck, 2011). 
Subsidies to rail transport are justified by objectives of social welfare: capital grants to network are 
aimed at increasing infrastructural facilities, operating grants to network are aimed at Increasing their 
use by those who offer transport services and finally subsidies related to service operators are aimed at 
Increasing demand from users. Shifting from a normative analysis to positive analysis, we note that 
not all grants awarded are used to increase the infrastructural facilities, the provision of transport 
services or related demand from consumers. Subsidies can be provided by public decision-makers in 
excessive quantities to meet the needs or may not be completely designed by those who perceive them 
to meet the needs for which they were awarded. In the presence of at least one of these phenomena, the 
following consequences could arise under specific conditions: (i) inefficient financing both of 
infrastructure managers and service operators (ii) cross-subsidisation of transport services (provided 
under a monopoly regime) thus receiving public aid and services performed in the open market that 
should not receive subsidies. The present study has also shown that the total revenue of rail passengers 
from the market and from public subsidies related to trains-Km result higher in Italy than in other 
analysed European countries. Further research is needed to shed light to what extent public subsidies 
are meant to grants for current expenses and grants related to assets across European incumbents 
within the railway sector, in fact, a recent communication of the Commission has set out a State aid 
reform programme in the communication on State aid modernisation (COM/2012/0209 final). The 
modernisation has three main, closely linked objectives: Foster growth in a strengthened, dynamic and 
competitive internal market, focus enforcement on cases with the biggest impact on the internal market 
and streamlined rules and faster decisions. The findings of this study help to fill the gap in estimating 
subsidies to European railway operators and to facilitate the implementation of the fourth railway 
package. 
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